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Indirect reciprocity in which players cooperate with unacquainted other players having good
reputations is a mechanism for cooperation in relatively large populations subjected to social dilemma
situations. When the population has group structure, as is often found in social networks, players in
experiments are considered to show behavior that deviates from existing theoretical models of indirect
reciprocity. First, players often show ingroup favoritism (i.e., cooperation only within the group) rather
than full cooperation (i.e., cooperation within and across groups), even though the latter is Pareto
efﬁcient. Second, in general, humans approximate outgroup members’ personal characteristics,
presumably including the reputation used for indirect reciprocity, by a single value attached to the
group. Humans use such a stereotypic approximation, a phenomenon known as outgroup homogeneity
in social psychology. I propose a model of indirect reciprocity in populations with group structure to
examine the possibility of ingroup favoritism and full cooperation. In accordance with outgroup
homogeneity, I assume that players approximate outgroup members’ personal reputations by a single
reputation value attached to the group. I show that ingroup favoritism and full cooperation are stable
under different social norms (i.e., rules for assigning reputations) such that they do not coexist in a
single model. If players are forced to consistently use the same social norm for assessing different types
of interactions (i.e., ingroup versus outgroup interactions), only full cooperation survives. The
discovered mechanism is distinct from any form of group selection. The results also suggest potential
methods for reducing ingroup bias to shift the equilibrium from ingroup favoritism to full cooperation.
& 2012 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
Humans and other animals often show cooperation in social
dilemma situations, in which defection apparently seems more
lucrative than cooperation. A main mechanism governing coop-
eration in such situations is direct reciprocity, in which the same
pairs of players repeatedly interact to realize mutual cooperation
(Trivers, 1971; Axelrod, 1984; Nowak, 2006a). In fact, individuals
who do not repeatedly interact also cooperate with others. In thisatical Informatics, The Uni-
656, Japan.
BY-NC-ND license.situation, reputation-based indirect reciprocity, also known as
downstream reciprocity, is a viable mechanism for cooperation
(Nowak and Sigmund, 1998a; Leimar and Hammerstein, 2001;
Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2004, 2007; Nowak and Sigmund, 2005;
Brandt and Sigmund, 2005, 2006). In this mechanism, which I
refer to as indirect reciprocity for simplicity, individuals carry
their own reputation scores, which represent an evaluation of
their past actions toward others. Individuals are motivated to
cooperate to gain good reputations so that they are helped by
others in the future or to reward (punish) good (bad) others.
Indirect reciprocity facilitates cooperation in a larger population
than in the case of direct reciprocity because unacquainted
players can cooperate with each other. Although evidence of
indirect reciprocity is relatively scarce for nonhumans (but see
Fig. 1. Schematic representation of ingroup and outgroup observers. In A, the
donor’s group gd and the recipient’s group gr are identical. This event occurs with
probability rin. In B, gdagr. This event occurs with probability r
out ¼ 1rin.
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cooperation in humans (Nowak and Sigmund, 2005).
Humans, in particular, belong to groups identiﬁed by traits,
such as age, ethnicity, and culture. Individuals presumably inter-
act more frequently with ingroup than outgroup members. Group
structure has been a main topic of research in social psychology
and sociology for many decades (Brown, 2000; Dovidio et al.,
2005) and in network science (Fortunato, 2010). Experimental
evidence suggests that, when the population of players has group
structure, two phenomena that are not captured by existing
models of indirect reciprocity take place.
First, in group-structured populations, humans (Sedikides
et al., 1998; Brewer, 1999; Hewstone et al., 2002; Dovidio et al.,
2005; Efferson et al., 2008) and even insect larvae (Lize et al.,
2006) show various forms of ingroup favoritism. In social
dilemma games, individuals behave more cooperatively toward
ingroup than outgroup members (e.g., De Cremer and van Vugt,
1999; Goette et al., 2006; Fowler and Kam, 2007; Rand et al.,
2009; Yamagishi et al., 1998, 1999; Yamagishi and Mifune, 2008).
Ingroup favoritism in social dilemma situations may occur as a
result of indirect reciprocity conﬁned in the group (Yamagishi
et al., 1998, 1999; Yamagishi and Mifune, 2008). In contrast,
ingroup favoritism in social dilemma games is not Pareto efﬁcient
because individuals would receive larger payoffs if they also
cooperated across groups. Under what conditions are ingroup
favoritism and intergroup cooperation sustained by indirect
reciprocity? Can they bistable?
Ingroup favoritism, which has also been analyzed in the
context of tag-based cooperation, the green beard effect, and
the armpit effect, has been considered to be a theoretical
challenge (e.g., Antal et al., 2009). Nevertheless, recent research
has revealed their mechanisms, including the loose coupling of
altruistic trait and tag in inheritance (Jansen and van Baalen,
2006), a relatively fast mutation that simultaneously changes
strategy and tag (Traulsen and Nowak, 2007; Traulsen, 2008), a
tag’s relatively fast mutation as compared to the strategy’s
mutation (Antal et al., 2009) conﬂicts between groups (Choi and
Bowles, 2007; Garcı´a and van den Bergh, 2011), partial knowledge
of others’ strategies (Masuda and Ohtsuki, 2007), and gene-
culture coevolution (Ihara, 2011). However, indirect reciprocity
accounts for ingroup favoritism, as is relevant to previous experi-
ments (Yamagishi et al., 1998, 1999; Yamagishi and Mifune,
2008) is lacking.
Second, in a population with group structure, individuals tend
to approximate outgroup individuals’ characteristics by a single
value attached to the group. This type of stereotype is known as
outgroup homogeneity in social psychology (Jones et al., 1981;
Ostrom and Sedikides, 1992; Sedikides et al., 1998; Brown, 2000),
and it posits that outgroup members tend to be regarded to
resemble each other more than they actually do. It is also
reasonable from the viewpoint of cognitive burden of remember-
ing each individual’s properties that humans generally resort to
outgroup homogeneity. Therefore, in indirect reciprocity games in
group structured populations, it seems to be natural to assume
outgroup homogeneity. In other words, individuals may not care
about or have access to personal reputations of those in different
groups and approximate an outgroup individual’s reputation by a
group reputation.
Some previous models analyzed the situations in which
players do not have access to individuals’ reputations. This is
simply because it may be difﬁcult for an individual in a large
population to separately keep track of other people’s reputations
even if gossiping helps dissemination of information. This case of
incomplete information has been theoretically modeled by intro-
ducing the probability that an individual sees others’ reputations
in each interaction (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998b, 1998a; Brandtand Sigmund, 2005, 2006; Suzuki and Toquenaga, 2005;
Nakamura and Masuda, 2011). However, these studies do not
have to do with the approximation of individuals’ personal
reputations by group reputations.
By analyzing a model of an indirect reciprocity game based on
group reputation, I provide an indirect reciprocity account for
ingroup favoritism for the ﬁrst time. In addition, through an
exhaustive search, I identify all the different types of stable
homogeneous populations that yield full cooperation (intragroup
and intergroup cooperation) or ingroup favoritism.2. Methods
2.1. Model
2.1.1. Population structure and the donation game
I assume that the population is composed of inﬁnitely many
groups each of which is of inﬁnite size. Each player belongs to
one group.
Players are involved in a series of the donation game, which is
essentially a type of prisoner’s dilemma game. In each round, a
donor and recipient are selected from the population in a
completely random manner. Each player is equally likely to be
selected as donor or recipient. The donor may refer to the
recipient’s reputation and select one of the two actions, coopera-
tion (C) or defection (D). If the donor cooperates, the donor pays
cost c40, and the recipient receives beneﬁt bð4cÞ. If the donor
defects, the payoffs to the donor and recipient are equal to 0.
Because the roles are asymmetric in a single game, the present
game differs from the one-shot or standard iterated versions of
the prisoner’s dilemma game. This game is widely used for
studying mechanisms for cooperation including indirect recipro-
city (Nowak and Sigmund, 2005; Nowak, 2006a, 2006b).
Rounds are repeated a sufﬁcient number of times with
different pairs of donors and recipients. Because the population
is inﬁnite, no pair of players meets more than once, thereby
avoiding the possibility of direct reciprocity (e.g., Nowak and
Sigmund, 1998a; Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2004). The payoff to each
player is deﬁned as the average payoff per round.
The groups to which the donor and recipient belong are
denoted by gd and gr, respectively. The simultaneously selected
donor and recipient belong to the same group with probability rin
(i.e., gd ¼ gr; Fig. 1A) and different groups with probability
rout  1rin (i.e., gdagr; Fig. 1B).
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At the end of each round, observers assign binary reputations,
good (G) or bad (B), to the donor and donor’s group (gd) according to
a given social norm. I consider up to the so-called second-order social
norms with which the observers assign G or B as a function of the
donor’s action and the reputation (i.e., G or B) of the recipient or
recipient’s group (gr). Representative second-order social norms are
shown in Fig. 2. Under image scoring (‘‘scoring’’ in Fig. 2), an observer
regards a donor’s action C or D to be G or B, respectively, regardless of
the recipient’s reputation. In the absence of a group-structured
population, scoring does not realize cooperation based on indirect
reciprocity unless certain speciﬁc conditions are met (Nowak and
Sigmund, 1998a; Brandt and Sigmund, 2005, 2006; Leimar and
Hammerstein, 2001; Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2004). Simple standing
(‘‘standing’’ in Fig. 2), and stern judging (‘‘judging’’ in Fig. 2; also
known as Kandori) enable full cooperation (Leimar and Hammerstein,
2001; Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2004). Shunning also enables full coopera-
tion if the players’ reputations are initially C and the number of
rounds is ﬁnite (Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2007) or if the players’ reputa-
tions are partially invisible (Nakamura and Masuda, 2011).
In the presence of group structure, four possible locations of
the observer are schematically shown in Fig. 1. I call the observer
belonging to gd an ‘‘ingroup’’ observer. Otherwise, the observer is
called an ‘‘outgroup’’ observer.
The observers can adopt different social norms for the four
cases, as summarized in Fig. 1. When the donor and recipient
belong to the same group (Fig. 1A), the ingroup observer uses the
norm denoted by sii to update the donor’s personal reputation. In
this situation, the outgroup observer does not update the donor’s
or gd’s reputation (but see Appendix A). When the donor and
recipient belong to different groups (Fig. 1B), the ingroup observer
uses the norm denoted by sio to update the donor’s personal
reputation. In this situation, the outgroup observer uses the norm
denoted by soo to update gd’s reputation. These four cases are
explained in more detail in Section 2.1.4.
The distinction between sii and sio allows the ingroup observer
to use a double standard for assessing donors. For example, a
donor defecting against an ingroup G recipient may be regarded
to be B, whereas a defection against an outgroup G recipient may
be regarded as G. Such different assessments would not be
allowed if sii and sio are not distinguished.
I call sii, sio, and soo subnorms. All the players are assumed to
share the subnorms. The typical norms shown in Fig. 2 can be
used as subnorms. A subnorm is speciﬁed by assigning G or B to
each combination of the donor’s action (i.e., C or D) and recipient’s
reputation (i.e., G or B). Therefore, there are 24 ¼ 16 subnorms. An
entire social norm of a population consists of a combination of the
three subnorms, and there are 163 ¼ 4096 social norms.Fig. 2. Typical second-order social norms. The rows outside the boxes represent
the donor’s actions (C or D), and the columns represent the recipient’s reputations
(G or B). The entries inside the boxes represent the reputations that the observer
assigns to the donor in each case.2.1.3. Action rule
The action rule refers to the mapping from the recipient’s
reputation (i.e., G or B) to the donor’s action (i.e., C or D). The AllC
and AllD donors cooperate and defect, respectively, regardless of
the recipient’s reputation. A discriminator (Disc) donor coop-
erates or defects when the recipient’s reputation is G or B,
respectively. An anti-discriminator (AntiDisc) donor cooperates
or defects when the recipient’s reputation is B or G, respectively.
The donor is allowed to use different action rules toward
ingroup and outgroup recipients. For example, a donor who
adopts AllC and AllD toward ingroup and outgroup recipients,
respectively, implements reputation-independent ingroup favor-
itism. There are 44¼16 action rules. A donor refers to the
recipient’s personal reputation when gd ¼ gr (Fig. 1A) and to gr’s
group reputation when gdagr (Fig. 1B).
2.1.4. Reputation updates
In each round, the ingroup and outgroup observers update the
donor’s and gd’s reputations, respectively.
If gd ¼ gr, the donor is assumed to recognize the recipient’s
personal reputation (Fig. 1A). An ingroup observer in this situation
updates the donor’s personal reputation on the basis of the donor’s
action, the recipient’s personal reputation, and subnorm sii. An
outgroup observer in this situation is assumed not to update gd’s
reputation because such an observer does not know the recipient’s
personal reputation, although the donor does. Then, the outgroup
observer may want to refrain from evaluating the donor because the
donor and the observer use different information about the recipient.
I also analyzed a variant of themodel in which the outgroup observer
updates gd’s reputation in this situation. The results are roughly the
same as those obtained for the original model (Appendix A).
If gdagr, the donor is assumed to recognize gr’s reputation,
but not the recipient’s personal reputation (Fig. 1B). An ingroup
observer in this situation updates the donor’s personal reputation
on the basis of the donor’s action, gr’s reputation, and subnorm sio.
Both the donor and observer refer to gr’s reputation and not to the
recipient’s personal reputation. An outgroup observer in this
situation updates gd’s reputation based on the donor’s action,
gr’s reputation, and subnorm soo.
An outgroup observer knows the recipient’s personal reputation
if the observer and recipient are in the same group. However, the
observer is assumed to ignore this information for two reasons.
First, it is evident for the observer that the donor does not have
access to the recipient’s personal reputation. To explain the second
reason, let us consider an outgroup observer who belongs to gr in a
certain round. Assume that this observer assigns a new reputation
to gd according to a subnorm different from one used when the
observer does not belong to gr. The same observer does not belong
to gr when the observer updates the gd’s group reputation next
time. This is because the probability that the observer belongs to gr
is inﬁnitesimally small because of the assumption of inﬁnite
groups. Therefore, the subnorm used when the observer belongs
to gr is rarely used and immaterial in the present model.
Finally, observers commit reputation assessment error. With
probability E, ingroup and outgroup observers independently
assign the reputation opposite to the intended one to the donor
and gd, respectively. I introduce this error because G and B players
must coexist in the population to distinguish the payoff values for
different pairs of action rule and social norm (action–norm pair);
such a distinction is necessary for the stability analysis in the
following discussion. For simplicity, I neglect other types of error.
2.1.5. Mutant types
To examine the stability of an action rule under a given social
norm, I consider two types of mutants.
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161¼15 types of single mutants. A single mutant does not affect
the action rule, norm, or reputation of the group that the mutant
belongs to because of the assumption of inﬁnite group size.
The second type is a group mutant. A homogeneous group
composed of mutants may make the mutant type stronger than
the resident type. For example, a group composed of players who
cooperate with ingroup recipients and defect against outgroup
recipients may invade a fully cooperative population if any
intergroup interaction (i.e., C or D) is regarded to be G under
soo. By deﬁnition, a group mutant is a homogeneous group of
mutants that is different from the resident players in either the
action rule or social norm. I consider two varieties of group
mutants, as described in Section 3.
2.2. Analysis methods
2.2.1. Reputation scores in the equilibrium
Consider a homogeneous resident population in which all
players share an action–norm pair. I will examine the stability
of this population against invasion by single and group mutants.
For this purpose, I calculate the fraction of players with a G
reputation, probability of cooperation, and payoff after inﬁnitely
many rounds.
Denote by pn and png the equilibrium probabilities that the
player’s and group’s reputations are G, respectively. The self-
consistent equation for pn is given by
pn ¼ rin½pnFinG ðsinÞþð1pnÞFinB ðsinÞþrout½pngFinG ðsoutÞþð1pngÞFinB ðsoutÞ,
ð1Þ
where sin and sout are the action rules (i.e., AllC, Disc, AntiDisc, or
AllD) that the donor adopts toward ingroup and outgroup
recipients, respectively. FinG ðsinÞ and FinB ðsinÞ are the probabilities
that the ingroup observer, based on sii, assigns reputation G to a
donor who has played with a G or B ingroup recipient (i.e.,
gd ¼ gr), respectively (Fig. 1A). Similarly FinG ðsoutÞ and FinB ðsoutÞ
apply when the recipient is in a different group (i.e., gdagr) and
the observer uses sio (Fig. 1B). It should be noted that F
in
G ðsinÞ and
FinG ðsoutÞ, for example, may differ from each other even if
sin ¼ sout. Owing to the reputation assignment error, FinG ðsinÞ,
FinB ðsinÞ, FinG ðsoutÞ, FinB ðsoutÞ AfE,1Eg holds true. For example, if
the donor is Disc toward ingroup recipients and subnorm sii is
scoring, FinG ðsinÞ ¼ 1E and FinB ðsinÞ ¼ E.
The self-consistent equation for png is given by
png ¼ rinpngþrout½pngFoutG ðsoutÞþð1pngÞFoutB ðsoutÞ, ð2Þ
where FoutG ðsoutÞAfE,1Eg and FoutB ðsoutÞAfE,1Eg are the prob-
abilities that the outgroup observer, based on soo, assigns reputa-
tion G to the donor’s group when the donor has played with a G or
B outgroup recipient (i.e., gdagr), respectively (Fig. 1B). The ﬁrst
term on the right-hand side of Eq. (2) corresponds to the fact that
gd’s reputation is not updated in the situation illustrated in Fig. 1A.
Eqs. (1) and (2) lead to
pn ¼ r
inFinB ðsinÞþrout½pngFinG ðsoutÞþð1pngÞFinB ðsoutÞ
1rinFinG ðsinÞþrinFinB ðsinÞ
ð3Þ
and
png ¼
routFoutB ðsoutÞ
1rinroutFoutG ðsoutÞþroutFoutB ðsoutÞ
: ð4Þ
2.2.2. Stability against invasion by single mutants
To examine the stability of the action rule (sin, sout) against
invasion by single mutants under a given social norm, I consider asingle mutant with action rule (sin
0
, sout0 ). Because the group is
assumed to be inﬁnitely large, a single mutant does not change
the reputation of the invaded group. The equilibrium probability
p0n that a mutant receives personal reputation G is given by
p0n ¼ rin½pnFinG ðsin
0 Þþð1pnÞFinB ðsin
0 Þþrout½pngFinG ðsout
0 Þþð1pngÞFinB ðsout
0 Þ:
ð5Þ
When the probability that the donor and gd have a G reputa-
tion is equal to p and pg, respectively, the resident donor
cooperates with probability
rinCðsin,pÞþroutCðsout,pgÞ, ð6Þ
where
Cð ~s, ~pÞ ¼ ~pzGð ~sÞþð1 ~pÞzBð ~sÞ ð ~p ¼ p,pgÞ ð7Þ
is the probability that a donor with action rule ~sAfAllC,Disc,
AntiDisc,AllDg cooperates when the recipient’s personal or group
reputation is G with probability ~p. zGð ~sÞ and zBð ~sÞ ( ~s ¼ sin or sout)
are the probabilities that a ~s donor cooperates with a G and B
recipient, respectively. AllC, Disc, AntiDisc, and AllD correspond to
ðzGð ~sÞ,zBð ~sÞÞ ¼ ð1,1Þ,ð1,0Þ,ð0,1Þ, and ð0,0Þ, respectively.
The payoff to a resident (sin, sout)-player is given by
p¼c½rinCðsin,pnÞþroutCðsout,pngÞþb½rinCðsin,pnÞþroutCðsout,pngÞ:
ð8Þ
The payoff to a (sin
0
, sout0 )–mutant invading the homogeneous
population of the resident action–norm pair is given by
p0 ¼ c½rinCðsin0 ,pnÞþroutCðsout0 ,pngÞþb½rinCðsin,p0nÞþroutCðsout,pngÞ:
ð9Þ
If p4p0 for any mutant, the pair of the action rule (sin, sout) and
social norm (sii, sio, soo) is stable against invasion by single
mutants.
2.2.3. Stability against invasion by group mutants
For a mutant group composed of players sharing an action–
norm pair, let p0ng denote the equilibrium probability that the
mutant group has group reputation G. I obtain
p0n ¼ rin½p0nFin0G ðsin
0 Þþð1p0nÞFin0B ðsin
0 Þ
þrout½pngFin0G ðsout
0 Þþð1pngÞFin0B ðsout
0 Þ ð10Þ
and
p0ng ¼ rinp0ng þrout½pngFoutG ðsout
0 Þþð1pngÞFoutB ðsout
0 Þ, ð11Þ
where Fin0G ðsin
0 Þ or Fin0B ðsin
0 Þ is the probability that an ingroup
observer assigns reputation G to a mutant donor who has played
with a G or B ingroup recipient, respectively. Even if sin
0
and sin
are the same, Fin0G ðsin
0 Þ will be generally different from FinG ðsinÞ
because the ingroup observer in the mutant group may use a
subnorm sii that is different from one used in the resident
population. Parallel deﬁnitions apply to Fin0G ðsout
0 Þ and Fin0B ðsout
0 Þ.
Eqs. (10) and (11) yield
p0n ¼ r
inFin0B ðsin
0 Þþrout½pngFin0G ðsout
0 Þþð1pngÞFin0B ðsout
0 Þ
1rinFin0G ðsin
0 ÞþrinFin0B ðsin
0 Þ
ð12Þ
and
p0ng ¼ pngFoutG ðsout
0 Þþð1pngÞFoutB ðsout
0 Þ, ð13Þ
respectively.
The payoff to a mutant player in the mutant group is given by
pg 0 ¼ c½rinCðsin
0
,p0nÞþroutCðsout0 ,pngÞþb½rinCðsin
0
,p0nÞþroutCðsout,p0ng Þ:
ð14Þ
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population is stable against invasion by group mutants.3. Results
3.1. Action–norm pairs stable against invasion by single mutants
There are 16 action rules and 163 ¼ 4096 social norms, which
leads to 164096¼65 536 action–norm pairs. Because of the
symmetry with respect to the swapping of G and B, I neglect
action–norm pairs in which the action rule (i.e., AllC, Disc,
AntiDisc, or AllD) toward ingroup recipients is sin ¼ AntiDisc
without loss of generality. Such an action–norm pair can be
converted to sin ¼Disc by swapping G and B in the action rule
and social norm. The model is also invariant if G and B group
reputations are completely swapped in the action rule toward
outgroup recipients sout and subnorms sio and soo. Therefore, I can
also neglect the action–norm pairs with sout ¼ AntiDisc without
loss of generality. This symmetry consideration leaves 65 536/
4¼16 384 action–norm pairs (Fig. 3).
I exhaustively examined the stability of all 164096¼65 536
action–norm pairs. A similar exhaustive search was ﬁrst con-
ducted in (Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2004) for an indirect reciprocity
game without group structure in the population. In the following,
p (Eq. (8)) mentions the player’s payoff in the resident population
in the limit of no reputation assignment error, i.e., E-0.
I ﬁrst describe action rules that are stable against invasion by
single mutants under a given social norm. I identiﬁed them using
Eqs. (1)–(9). Under any given social norm, action rule (sin, sout) ¼
(AllD, AllD) is stable and yields p¼ 0. Other action–norm pairs
also yield p¼ 0, but there are 588 stable action–norm pairs with
p40 (Fig. 3). For a given social norm, at most one action rule that
yields a positive payoff is stable. For all 588 solutions, the
condition for stability against invasion by single mutants (i.e.,
p4p0, where p and p0 are given by Eqs. (8) and (9), respectively)
is given by
brin4c: ð15Þ
Eq. (15) implies that cooperation is likely when the beneﬁt-to-
cost ratio is large, which is a standard result for different
mechanisms of cooperation in social dilemma games (Nowak,
2006b). Cooperation is also likely when intragroup interaction is
relatively more frequent than intergroup interaction (i.e., large
rin).Fig. 3. Procedure for obtaining the stable action–norm pairs with perfect ingroup
cooperation shown in Tables 1 and 3.3.2. Stability against invasion by group mutants
The stability of these 588 action–norm pairs against invasion
by group mutants was also examined based on Eqs. (10)–(14).
Properly setting the variety of group mutants is not a trivial issue.
At most, 65 5361¼65 535 types of group mutants that differ
from the resident population in either action rule or social norm
are possible. However, an arbitrarily selected homogeneous
mutant group may be fragile to invasion by different single
mutants into the mutant group. Although I do not model evolu-
tionary dynamics, evolution would not allow the emergence and
maintenance of such weak mutant groups. With this in mind, I
consider two group mutation scenarios.3.2.1. Scenario 1
Single mutants may invade the resident population when Eq.
(15) is violated. In this scenario 1, the mutants are assumed to
differ from the resident population in the action rule, but not the
social norm, for simplicity. There are 161¼15 such mutants,
and some of them, including ðsin,soutÞ ¼ ðAllD,AllDÞ, can invade
the resident population when 1ob=co1=rin. Such mutant action
rules may spread to occupy a single group when Eq. (15) is
violated. I consider the stability of the resident population against
the homogeneous groups of mutants that invade the resident
population as single mutants when 1ob=co1=rin.
Among the 588 action–norm pairs that yield p40, 440 pairs
are stable against group mutation. Among these 440 pairs, I focus
on those yielding perfect intragroup cooperation, i.e., those
yielding limE-0Cðsin,pnÞ ¼ 1, where C and pn are given in
Section 2.2. For the other stable pairs, see Appendix B. This
criterion is satisﬁed by 270 pairs (Fig. 3). For all 270 pairs, every
player obtains personal reputation G (i.e., limE-0p
n ¼ 1), and the
donor cooperates with ingroup recipients because the recipients
have reputation G (i.e., sin ¼Disc).
In all 270 pairs, sii is either standing (GBGG in shorthand
notation), judging (GBBG), or shunning (GBBB) (refer to Fig. 2 for
deﬁnitions of these norms). In the shorthand notation, the ﬁrst,
second, third, and fourth letters (either G or B) indicate the
donor’s or gd’s new reputation when the donor cooperates with
a G recipient, the donor defects against a G recipient, the donor
cooperates with a B recipient, and the donor defects against a B
recipient, respectively. Standing, judging, and shunning in sii are
exchangeable for any ﬁxed combination of sin ¼Disc, sout, sio, and
soo. Therefore, there are 270/3¼90 combinations of sout, sio, and
soo, which are summarized in Table 1. An asterisk indicates an
entry that can be either G or B. For example, GBnG indicates
standing (GBGG) or judging (GBBG). The probability of coopera-
tion toward outgroup recipients, payoff (p; Eq. (8)), and the
probability that a group has a G reputation (png; Eq. (2)) are also
shown in Table 1. The stable action–norm pairs can be classiﬁed
into three categories. Full cooperation: Donors behave as Disc toward outgroup
recipients, i.e., sout ¼Disc and cooperate with both ingroup
and outgroup recipients with probability 1. Accordingly,
p¼ bc and png ¼ 1.
In this case, indirect reciprocity among different groups as well
as that within single groups is realized. Action rule
sin ¼ sout ¼Disc is stable if sio is either standing (GBGG),
judging (GBBG), or shunning (GBBB) and soo is either standing
or judging. The condition for stability against group mutation
is the mildest one (i.e., b4c) for each action–norm pair.
Under full cooperation, sio and sio must be the one that
stabilizes cooperation in the standard indirect reciprocity
game without a group-structured population (Ohtsuki and
Table 1
Stable action–norm pairs with perfect ingroup cooperation under scenario 1. The
probability of cooperation with outgroup recipients, p, and png are the values in the
limit E-0. sii ¼GBGG (standing), GBBG (judging), or GBBB (shunning). Action–
norm pairs only different in sii were distinguished when counting the number of
stable action–norm pairs. An asterisk indicates that both G and B apply.
State Prob. C to
outgroup
p sout png Social norm
ðsiosooÞ
No
pairs
Full cooperation 1 bc Disc 1 GBnG–GBnG 18
GBBB–GBnG
Partial ingroup
favoritism
1
2
ðbcÞð1þ rin Þ
2
Disc 1
2
GBnG-GBnB 12
Perfect ingroup
favoritism
0 ðbcÞrin AllD 1 nGBB–nGnG 72
nGBG–nGnG
nGGG–nGnG
1
2
nGnG–nGnB 96
nGnG–nBnG
0 BBnG–nBnB 72
BGnG–nBnB
GGnG–nBnB
Table 2
Conditions for stability of partial ingroup favoritism against group mutation under
scenario 1. The condition on rin is required for the three out of 12 social norms to
prevent the invasion by group mutants that defect against ingroup recipients and
cooperate with outgroup recipients.
Conditions Social norm (sii) Social norm ðsiosooÞ No. pairs
b4c GBGG, GBBG, or GBBB GBBG–GBBB 9
GBGG–GBBB
GBBG–GBGB
b4c and rin4
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
1 GBGG GBGG–GBGB 1
b4c and rin41=2 GBBG or GBBB GBGG–GBGB 2
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2007). The ingroup observer monitors donors’ actions toward
outgroup recipients through the use of sio ¼ standing, judging,
or shunning, even though ingroup players are not directly
harmed if donors defect against outgroup recipients. The
ingroup observer does so because donors’ defection against
outgroup recipients would negatively affect the group’s
reputation. Partial ingroup favoritism: Donors adopt sout ¼Disc and coop-
erate with ingroup recipients with probability 1 and outgroup
recipients with probability 1/2. Accordingly, p¼ ðbcÞð1þrinÞ=
2 and png ¼ 1=2.
In this case, action rule sin ¼ sout ¼Disc is stable if sio is either
standing (GBGG) or judging (GBBG), and soo is either scoring
(GBGB) or shunning (GBBB). The condition for stability against
group mutation is shown in Table 2. Perfect ingroup favoritism: Donors adopt sout ¼ AllD and always
cooperate with ingroup recipients and never with outgroup
recipients regardless of the recipient’s group reputation.
Accordingly, p¼ ðbcÞrin.
Table 1 suggests that action rule ðsin,soutÞ ¼ ðDisc,AllDÞ can be
stable for any subnorm soo. This is true because the group
reputation, whose update rule is given by soo, is irrelevant in
the current situation; the donor anyway defects against out-
group recipients. Nevertheless, soo determines sio that is
consistent with ingroup cooperation through the probability
of a G group reputation png.
When soo ¼ nGnG, the outgroup observer evaluates defection
against outgroup recipients to be G (Fig. 1B). Therefore, png ¼ 1.In this case, sio ¼ nGBB, nGBG, and nGGG stabilize perfect
ingroup favoritism. Under any of these sio, the ingroup obser-
ver assigns G to a donor that defects against a recipient in a G
outgroup because the second entry of sio is equal to G in each
case. Therefore, pn ¼ 1, and full ingroup cooperation is stable.
When soo ¼ nGnB or nBnG, the outgroup observer evaluates
defection against outgroup recipients to be G with probability
1/2. Therefore, png ¼ 1=2. In this case, sio ¼ nGnG stabilizes
perfect ingroup favoritism. Under such an sio, the ingroup
observer assigns G to a donor that defects against a recipient in
a G outgroup because the second and fourth entries of sio are
equal to G.
When soo ¼ nBnB, the outgroup observer evaluates defection
against outgroup recipients to be B. Therefore, png ¼ 0. In this
case, sio ¼ BBnG, BGnG, and GGnG stabilize perfect ingroup
favoritism. Under such an sio, the ingroup observer assigns G to
a donor that defects against a recipient in a G outgroup
because the fourth entry of sio is equal to G.
In all the cases, the stability against invasion by group mutants
requires b4c.3.2.2. Scenario 2
In scenario 2 of group mutation, it is hypothesized that a group
of mutants immigrates from a different population that is stable
against invasion by single mutants. Such a group mutant may
appear owing to the encounter of different stable cultures (i.e.,
action–norm pairs). The pairs that are stable against invasion by
single mutants and yield zero payoff, such as the population of
AllD players, must be also included in the group mutant list. It
should be noted that a mutant group may have a different social
norm from that for the resident population.
Among the 588 action–norm pairs that are stable against
single mutation, no pair is stable against group mutation. How-
ever, 140 pairs are stable against group mutation for any b4c in a
relaxed sense that the resident player’s payoff is not smaller than
the group mutant’s payoff, i.e., pZpg 0 (Fig. 3). The homogeneous
population of each pair is neutrally invaded by some group
mutants, i.e., p¼ pg 0. Therefore, I examine the evolutionary
stability (e.g., Nowak, 2006a) against group mutation. In other
words, for the group mutants yielding p¼ pg 0, I require p4pg 0
when the resident players are replaced by group mutants.
All 140 action–norm pairs are evolutionarily stable except that
each pair is still neutrally invaded by their cousins. For example,
four action–norm pairs speciﬁed by sin ¼ sout ¼Disc, sii ¼GBnG,
sio ¼GBnG, soo ¼GBGG neutrally invade each other. These pairs
yield the same payoff p¼ bc and are evolutionarily stable
against invasion by the other group mutants. Therefore, I con-
clude that the four pairs collectively form a set of stable solutions.
Other sets of stable solutions consist of four or eight neutrally
invadable action–norm pairs that yield the same payoff and differ
only in sii and sio.
All 140 pairs realize perfect intragroup cooperation such that
the players have G personal reputations and sin ¼Disc (Fig. 3).
Subnorm sii ¼GBGG (i.e., standing) or GBBG (i.e., judging) is
exchangeable for any ﬁxed combination of sin ¼Disc, sout, sio,
and soo. Therefore, there are 140/2¼70 possible combinations of
sout, sio, and soo, which are listed in Table 3. The 140 pairs are a
subset of the 270 pairs stable under scenario 1. The stable sets of
action–norm pairs can be classiﬁed into three categories. (1) Full
cooperation occurs if all the subnorms are standing or judging. As
already mentioned as an example, under soo ¼GBGG, the four
action–norm pairs ðsin,sout,sii,sioÞ ¼ ðDisc,Disc,GBGG,GBGGÞ,
(Disc, Disc, GBGG, GBBG), (Disc, Disc, GBBG, GBGG), and (Disc,
Disc, GBBG, GBBG) can neutrally invade each other. Similarly, if
Table 3
Stable action–norm pairs with perfect ingroup cooperation under scenario 2. sii ¼GBGG (standing) or GBBG (judging). Different action–norm pairs in the same row are
neutrally invadable to each other. An asterisk indicates either G or B.
State Prob. C to outgroup p sout png Social norm ðsiosooÞ No pairs
Full cooperation 1 bc Disc 1 GBnG–GBGG 8
GBnG–GBBG
Partial ingroup favoritism 1
2
ðbcÞð1þ rinÞ
2
Disc 1
2
GBnG–GBBB 4
1 nGnG–BGBG 32
nGnG–GGBG
nGnG–BGGG
nGnG–GGGG
Perfect ingroup favoritism 0 ðbcÞrin AllD 12 nGnG–BGBB 64
nGnG–GGBB
nGnG–BGGB
nGnG–GGGB
nGnG–BBBG
nGnG–GBBG
nGnG–BBGG
nGnG–GBGG
0 nGnG–BBBB 32
nGnG–GBBB
nGnG–BBGB
nGnG–GBGB
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realizing stable full cooperation. These two sets of four pairs are
evolutionarily stable against invasion by each other. In total, there
are eight pairs that realize full cooperation. (2) Partial ingroup
favoritism occurs for a set of four action–norm pairs. (3) Perfect
ingroup favoritism occurs under the same subnorms soo as those
for scenario 1. For a ﬁxed soo, the same eight action–norm pairs
ðsin,sout,sii,sioÞ ¼ ðDisc,AllD,GBnG,nGnGÞ yield the same payoff
p¼ ðbcÞrin, can neutrally invade each other, and are evolutiona-
rily stable against the other group mutants.3.3. When observers use simpler social norms
In fact, players may not differentiate between the three
subnorms. Players may use a common norm for assessing ingroup
donors irrespective of the location of recipients. Table 1 indicates
that, if sii ¼ sio is imposed for the resident population, but not for
mutants, perfect ingroup favoritism is excluded. Under scenario 1,
full cooperation is stable when sii ¼ sio ¼ standing, judging, or
shunning and soo ¼ standing or judging. Partial ingroup favoritism
is stable when sii ¼ sio ¼ standing or judging and soo ¼ scoring or
shunning. Under scenario 2, full cooperation is stable when
sii ¼ sio ¼ standing or judging and soo ¼ standing or judging. Partial
ingroup favoritism is stable when sii ¼ sio ¼ standing or judging
and soo ¼ shunning.
Alternatively, players may use a common norm for assessing
donors playing with outgroup recipients irrespective of the
location of donors. If siiasio is allowed and sio ¼ soo is imposed,
partial ingroup favoritism is excluded. Under scenario 1, full
cooperation is stable when sii ¼ standing, judging, or shunning
and sio ¼ soo ¼ standing or judging. Perfect ingroup favoritism is
stable when sii ¼ standing, judging, or shunning and sio ¼ soo ¼
nGnG. The results under scenario 2 differ from those under
scenario 1 only in that sii ¼ shunning is disallowed.
Finally, if all the three subnorms are forced to be equal, only
full cooperation is stable, and the norm is standing or judging.
This holds true for both scenarios 1 and 2.4. Discussion
4.1. Summary of the results
I identiﬁed the pairs of action rule and social norm that are stable
against invasion by single and group mutants in the game of group-
structured indirect reciprocity. Full cooperation (i.e., cooperation
within and across groups) based on personal and group reputations,
partial ingroup favoritism, and perfect ingroup favoritism are stable
under different social norms. Perfect ingroup favoritism is attained
only when the donor defects against outgroup recipients regardless
of their reputation (i.e., sout ¼ AllD). Perfect ingroup favoritism does
not occur with the combination of a donor that is ready to cooperate
with G outgroup recipients (i.e., sout ¼Disc) and a B group reputa-
tion. The mechanism for ingroup favoritism revealed in this study is
distinct from those proposed previously (see Section 1).
The major condition for either full cooperation, partial ingroup
favoritism, and perfect ingroup favoritism, depending on the
assumed social norm, is given by brin4c. In only 3 out of 270 social
norms in scenario 1, an additional condition for rin is imposed
(Section 3.2.1). In general, different mechanisms of cooperation can
be understood in an uniﬁed manner such that cooperation occurs if
and only if b/c is larger than a threshold value (Nowak, 2006b). For
example, b/c must be larger than the inverse of the relatedness
parameter r and the inverse of the discount factor in kin selection
and direct reciprocity, respectively. The present result also ﬁts this
view; rin corresponds to r in the case of kin selection.
I assumed that players approximate personal reputations of
individuals in other groups by group reputations (i.e., outgroup
homogeneity). Adoption of outgroup homogeneity may be evolutio-
narily beneﬁcial for players owing to the reduction in the cognitive
burden of recognizing others’ personal reputations. Instead, the
players pay potential costs of not being able to know the personal
reputations of individuals in other groups. To explore evolutionary
origins of group reputation, one has to examine competition between
players using the group reputation and players not using it. It would
also be necessary to introduce a parameter representing the cost of
obtaining personal reputations of outgroup individuals. Such an
analysis is warranted for future work.
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assumption may be justiﬁed for well-mixed populations but less
so for populations with group structure because group structure
implies relatively little intergroup communication. It seems to be
more natural to assume that subnorms sii and sio, which are used
to evaluate actions of ingroup donors, depend on groups. Under
scenario 2 (Section 3.2.2), any stable action–norm pair is neutrally
invaded by its cousins who are different in sii and sio. This result
implies that different groups can use different norms. For exam-
ple, for all the solutions shown in Table 3, some groups can use
sii ¼GBGG (i.e., standing), while other groups in the same popula-
tion can use sio ¼GBBG (i.e., judging). To better understand the
possibility of heterogeneous social norms, analyzing a population
composed of a small number of groups, probably by different
methods, would be helpful.
4.2. Cooperation based on group reputation is distinct from group
selection
Indirect reciprocity based on group reputation is distinct from
any type of group selection. This is true for both full cooperation
and ingroup favoritism. There are two dominant variants of group
selection that serve as mechanisms for cooperation in social
dilemma games (West et al., 2007, 2008).
The ﬁrst type is group competition, in which selection pressure
acts on groups such that a group with a large mean payoff would
replace one with a small mean payoff. Models with group
competition induce ingroup favoritism (Choi and Bowles, 2007;
Garcı´a and van den Bergh, 2011), altruistic punishment (Boyd
et al., 2003), and evolution of the judging social norm in the
standard game of indirect reciprocity whereby players interact
within each group (Pacheco et al., 2006; Chalub et al., 2006). In
contrast, the present study is not concerned with evolutionary
dynamics including group competition. The group mutant is
assumed to statically compare the payoff to the resident group
with that to the mutant group.
The second type of group selection requires assortative repro-
duction in the sense that the offspring have a higher probability of
belonging to speciﬁc groups than to other groups depending on
the offspring’s genotype. It is mathematically identical with kin
selection (West et al., 2007, 2008). This variant of group selection
is also irrelevant to the present model, which is not concerned
with the reproduction process.
The analysis in this study is purely static. I avoided examining
evolutionary dynamics for two reasons. First, the discovered
mechanism for cooperation may be confused with group selection
in the presence of evolutionary dynamics. Second, the model
becomes needlessly complicated. Introducing evolutionary
dynamics implies that one speciﬁes a rule for reproduction.
Offspring may be assumed to belong to the parent’s group or to
migrate to another group. It may then be necessary to consider
the treatment of, for example, the heterogeneous group size.
Because evolutionary dynamics are neglected, the present model
explains neither emergence of full cooperation and ingroup
favoritism nor the likelihood of different solutions, which is a
main limitation of the present study.
I stress that the concept of group mutants is introduced to sift
the set of stable action–norm pairs. Unless group competition is
assumed, the concept of group mutants does not particularly
promote cooperation in evolutionary dynamics.
4.3. Group competition can enable full cooperation and ingroup
favoritism even if brin4c is violated
Under a proper social norm, full cooperation or ingroup favoritism
is stable if brin4c (i.e., Eq. (15) is satisﬁed) in most cases. Withprobability rin, the donor, recipient, and observer are engaged in the
standard (i.e., no group structure) indirect reciprocity game limited
to a single group (Fig. 1A). In the standard indirect reciprocity game
under incomplete information, bq4c is quite often the condition for
cooperation, where q is the probability that the recipient’s reputation
is observed. This holds true when q indicates the observation
probability for the donor (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998a,b; Brandt
and Sigmund, 2005, 2006; Suzuki and Toquenaga, 2005) or that for
both the donor and observer (Nakamura andMasuda, 2011). Because
rin is also equal to the probability that the donor sees the recipient’s
personal reputation, rin resembles q. In fact, replacing rin by q in Eq.
(15) yields bq4c.
If a player is capable of recognizing the personal reputation of
a ﬁxed number of others, the maximum population size for which
indirect reciprocity is possible in the standard indirect reciprocity
game scales as 1/q. The consistency between Eq. (15) and bq4c
implies that the concept of group reputation does not increase the
maximum population size for which indirect reciprocity occurs.
However, under group competition (Section 4.2), full cooperation
and ingroup favoritism can be stable even if the restriction
imposed by Eq. (15) is removed.
To explain this point, assume that the population is subjected
to evolutionary dynamics such that players with relatively large
payoffs would bear more offspring in the same group and group
competition occurs. The rate of group competition is denoted by
1=tgc, where tgc is the mean time interval between successive
group competition events. Emergence of a single mutant occurs
with rate 1=tm. Selection and reproduction of single players occur
with rate 1=ts.
If Eq. (15) is violated, single mutants emerge in time ptm.
Then, some types of mutants, including the AllD mutant, spread in
the invaded group in time pts under scenario 1 of group
mutation. The invaded group presumably possesses a smaller
group-averaged payoff than other resident groups because the
resident population is stable against invasion by group mutants as
long as b4c, in all but three of 270 action–norm pairs (Table 2). If
1=tgcb1=tm, such an invaded group is likely to be eradicated by
group competition because group competition occurs much faster
than the emergence of single mutants. In this case, full coopera-
tion or ingroup favoritism, depending on the given social norm,
can be maintained in the absence of Eq. (15). This discussion does
not involve timescale ts.
Group competition is needed to remove Eq. (15). If Eq. (15) is
imposed, cooperation occurs without group competition.
4.4. Relationship to previous behavioral experiments
In this section, I discuss possible linkages between the present
model and the previous experiments examining indirect recipro-
city and third-party punishments.
Yamagishi and colleagues conducted a series of laboratory
experiments to show that ingroup favoritism is induced by a
group heuristic (Yamagishi et al., 1998, 1999; Yamagishi and
Mifune, 2008). With a group heuristic, donors cooperate with
ingroup recipients because the donors expect repayment from
other ingroup players. Donors do not use the information about
others’ reputations in these experiments. In contrast, players use
personal reputations of ingroup members in the present model.
Nevertheless, the previous experiments and the current model do
not contradict each other.
In another laboratory experiment, Mifune et al. showed that
presentation of eye-like painting promotes donor’s cooperation
toward ingroup recipients in the dictator game (Mifune et al.,
2010). For expository purposes, I deﬁne serious subnorm to be
either standing, judging, or shunning. If the eye-like painting
approximates an ingroup observer obeying a serious subnorm,
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because ingroup cooperation is theoretically stable when the
ingroup observer adopts a serious subnorm. Because the painting
does not increase the cooperation toward outgroup recipients
(Mifune et al., 2010), it may not turn sio to a serious subnorm for
some psychological reason. Humans may use double standards,
i.e., siiasio, which favor ingroup favoritism in my model.
Other behavioral experiments have addressed the relationship
between third-party altruistic punishments and ingroup favorit-
ism (Bernhard et al., 2006; Shinada et al., 2004). In precise terms,
third-party punishments and reputation-based indirect recipro-
city are distinct mechanisms for cooperation (Sigmund et al.,
2001; Ohtsuki et al., 2009). Nevertheless, below I discuss possible
linkages between these experiments and my model.
In indigenous communities in Papua New Guinea (Bernhard
et al., 2006), the amount of punishment is larger if the punisher
belongs to the donor’s group than to a different group (compare
ABC and AB cases in their Fig. 1). Their results suggest that the
ingroup observer may use a serious subnorm and the outgroup
observer may not. Furthermore, given that the punisher is in the
donor’s group, the amount of punishment is larger if the donor
and recipient belong to the same group (Fig. 1A, if the punisher is
identiﬁed with the ingroup observer) than if they belong to
different groups (Fig. 1B; compare the ABC and AC cases in
Fig. 1 of Bernhard et al., 2006). In this situation, the ingroup
observer may use a serious subnorm sii when the donor plays
with ingroup recipients (Fig. 1A) and use a nonserious subnorm
sio when the donor plays with outgroup recipients (Fig. 1B). My
model reproduces ingroup favoritism under these conditions.
However, my model and others are not concerned with a main
ﬁnding in Bernhard et al. (2006) that the amount of punishment is
larger when the punisher and recipient belong to the same group.
For the reasons stated in Section 2.1.4, I did not assume that
observers make their judgments differently when they belong to
the recipient’s group gr and to a different group. To theoretically
explain the main ﬁnding in Bernhard et al. (2006), one should
explicitly analyze the case of a ﬁnite number of groups.
In different laboratory experiments, the amount of punish-
ment is larger for an ingroup donor’s defection than an outgroup
donor’s defection (Shinada et al., 2004). My results are consistent
with their results in that, for ingroup favoritism, the donor’s
action must be seriously evaluated by the ingroup observer using
sii and not seriously by the outgroup observer using soo.4.5. Reduction of ingroup favoritism
Although ingroup favoritism seems to be a canonical behavior
of humans, reduction of ingroup bias would induce intergroup
cooperation and is socially preferable (Yamagishi et al., 1998). Full
cooperation is Pareto efﬁcient, whereas ingroup favoritism is not.
Various psychological and sociological mechanisms for reducing
the ingroup bias, such as guilt, ‘‘auto-motive’’ control, retraining,
empathy, and decategorization have been proposed (Hewstone
et al., 2002; Dovidio et al., 2005; Sedikides et al., 1998).
My results provide theory-based possibilities of reducing
ingroup bias. First, if the social norm is ﬁxed, conversion from
ingroup favoritism to full cooperation is theoretically impossible
because full cooperation and ingroup favoritism do not coexist
under a given social norm. Therefore, advising players to change
their behavior toward outgroup recipients from AllD to Disc is not
recommended unless the social norm is also altered. Conversion
from ingroup favoritism to full cooperation requires a change in
the social norm such that players as observers seriously assess
ingroup donors’ actions toward outgroup recipients (with sio) and
outgroup–outgroup interaction (with soo). In particular, if sio is aserious subnorm, perfect ingroup favoritism with no intergroup
cooperation disappears (Section 3.3).
Second, if the three subnorms are the same, the perfect and
partial ingroup favoritism is eradicated. The coincidence of only
two subnorms is insufﬁcient to induce full cooperation (Section
3.3). The subnorms sii ¼ sio ¼ soo that exclude the ingroup bias and
realize full cooperation are standing or judging. Therefore, with-
out speaking of serious subnorms, forcing players to use the same
subnorms consistently in assessing donors in different situations
may be also effective in inducing full cooperation.
Ingroup favoritism has been mostly an experimental question
except for some recent theoretical studies. This study is a ﬁrst
step toward understanding and even manipulating the dichotomy
between full cooperation and ingroup favoritism in the context of
indirect reciprocity.Acknowledgments
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(No. 20115009)) from MEXT, Japan.Appendix A. A variant of the model with different reputation
dynamics
In this section, I analyze a variant of the model in which
outgroup observers update the group reputation of donors
involved in ingroup interaction (i.e., gd ¼ gr).
A.1. Reputation dynamics
I assume that the outgroup observer uses the donor’s action,
the recipient’s personal reputation, and soo, to update gd’s (not the
donor’s personal) reputation.
The equivalent of Eq. (2) under this reputation update rule is
given by
png ¼ rin½pnFoutG ðsinÞþð1pnÞFoutB ðsinÞþrout½pngFoutG ðsoutÞþð1pngÞFoutB ðsoutÞ:
ð16Þ
I obtain pn and png by solving the set of linear equations (1) and
(16). Eqs. (5)–(10), and (12) are unchanged. As compared to the
case of the original reputation update rule (original case for
short), Eq. (11) is replaced by
p0ng ¼ rin½p0nFoutG ðsin
0 Þþð1p0nÞFoutB ðsin
0 Þ
þrout½pngFoutG ðsout
0 Þþð1pngÞFoutB ðsout
0 Þ: ð17Þ
The equivalent of Eq. (13) is obtained by substituting Eq. (12) in
Eq. (17).
Because of the symmetry with respect to G and B, I exclude
action rules having sin ¼ AntiDisc from the exhaustive search, as I
did in the original case (Section 3.1). It should be noted that one
cannot eliminate action–norm pairs with sout ¼ AntiDisc on the
basis of symmetry consideration, which is different from the
original case. This is because a player’s personal and group
reputations are interrelated through the behavior of the outgroup
observer when gd ¼ gr.
A.2. Results
Under the modiﬁed reputation update rule, there are 725
action–norm pairs that are stable against invasion by single
mutants and yield p40.
Table 4
Stable action–norm pairs with a positive probability of cooperation that are not included in Table 1. sii ¼GBGG (standing), GBBG (judging), or GBBB (shunning). An asterisk
indicates either G or B. The sixth and seventh rows in the table are not aggregated because the stability condition is different between these cases (Appendix B).
Prob. C to ingroup Prob. C to outgroup p sout pn png Social norm ðsiisiosooÞ No. pairs
1
2
1
2
bc
2
Disc 1
2
1
2
GBBB-GBBB–GBnB 2
1
2
0 ðbcÞrin
2
AllD 1
2
1
2
GBBB–nGBB-nGnB 32
GBBB–BBnG-nGnB
GBBB–nGBB-nBnG
GBBB–BBnG-nBnG
1þ rin
2
1
2
ðbcÞð1þðrinÞ2Þ
2
Disc 1þ rin
2
1
2
GBnG–GBBB-GBGB 4
GBnG–GBBB-GBBB
1þ rin
2
0 ðbcÞrin ð1þ rin Þ
2
AllD 1þ rin
2
1
2
GBnG–nGBB–nGnB 64
GBnG–BBnG–nGnB
GBnG–nGBB–nBnG
GBnG–BBnG–nBnG
rin 0 ðbcÞðrinÞ2 AllD rin 1 GBnG–BBBB-nGnG 68
GBnG–BBnG–nGnG
1
2
GBnG–BBBB–nGnB
GBnG–BBBB–nBnG
Disc 0 GBnG–GBBB–BBnB
AllD GBnG–BBBB–nBnB
GBnG–nGBB–nBnB
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group mutation, and 324 out of the 507 pairs yield perfect
ingroup cooperation. The 324 action–norm pairs are classiﬁed
as follows. First, 68 pairs yield full cooperation with either
ðsin,soutÞ ¼ ðDisc,DiscÞ or (Disc, AntiDisc). Second, 14 pairs yield
partial ingroup favoritism with ðsin,soutÞ ¼ ðDisc,AntiDiscÞ. Third,
236 pairs yield perfect ingroup favoritism with ðsin,soutÞ ¼
ðDisc,AllDÞ. Fourth, six pairs yield perfect ingroup favoritism with
ðsin,soutÞ ¼ ðDisc,AntiDiscÞ.
As in the original case, sin ¼Disc, and sii is either standing,
judging, or shunning for these pairs. In contrast to the original
case, ðsin,soutÞ ¼ ðDisc,AntiDiscÞ can be stable, yield perfect
ingroup cooperation, and even yield outgroup cooperation, under
some social norms. In such a situation, the values of the personal
and group reputations (i.e., G and B) have opposite meanings. In
other words, a G but not B personal reputation elicits intragroup
cooperation, while a B but not G group reputation elicits inter-
group cooperation. Therefore, action rule ðsin,soutÞ ¼
ðDisc,AntiDiscÞ in this situation can be regarded as a relative of
ðsin,soutÞ ¼ ðDisc,DiscÞ in the situation in which the values of the
personal and group reputations have the same meaning. On this
basis, I consider that the present results are similar to those
obtained for the original case (Table 1). In particular, only full
cooperation is stable under standing or judging if sii, sio, and soo
are assumed to be the same.
Under scenario 2, 144 out of 725 pairs are stable against group
mutation, and all of them yield perfect ingroup cooperation. The
140 pairs that survive in the original case (Section 3.2.2) also
survive under the modiﬁed reputation update rule. The action
rule in the additional four (¼144140) pairs is ðsin,soutÞ ¼
ðDisc,AntiDiscÞ. Another difference from the original case is that
the action–norm pairs that yield partial ingroup favoritism in
Table 3 realize full cooperation in the present case. Otherwise, the
results are the same as those in the original case. In summary, 16
pairs realize full cooperation, and 128 pairs realize perfect
ingroup favoritism. As is the case for scenario 1, only full
cooperation is stable with standing or judging if the three
subnorms are assumed to be the same.Appendix B. The rest of the stable action–norm pairs under
scenario 1
Under scenario 1 in the original case, 270 out of 440 stable
action–norm pairs with a positive payoff realize perfect
intragroup cooperation (Section 3.2.1). The other 170 stable
action–norm pairs yielding p40 are summarized in Table 4. For
all the stable action–norm pairs shown, sin ¼Disc. Table 4 indi-
cates that outgroup favoritism does not occur.
There are 18 rows in Table 4. For the two action–norm pairs
shown in the ﬁrst row, the stability condition is given by brin4c
and rino1=2. For the two action–norm pairs shown in the sixth
row, the stability condition is given by brin4c and rin4
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
1.
For the four action–norm pairs shown in the 16th row, the
stability condition is given by b=c4 ð1þrinÞ=rin. For all the other
action–norm pairs, the stability condition is given by brin4c.References
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